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A NORMALIZED 
SCORING MODEL FOR 
LAW SCHOOL COMPETITIONS 
Edward K. Cheng & Scott J. Farmer† 
1. INTRODUCTION 
HE STRUCTURE OF MOOT COURT COMPETITIONS, particu-
larly at the “round robin” stage, commonly generates 
concerns about consistency. Teams face different judging 
panels, and panel composition frequently changes based 
on the day and time availability of judges. In short, few teams ulti-
mately face the same group of judges. And given that the judges are 
drawn from disparate populations (faculty, practitioners, students) 
and bring a diverse set of reference points to the competition, fair-
ness concerns quickly enter the discussion. Did Team A win because 
it drew a particularly generous set of judges? Did Team B lose be-
cause it drew a particular harsh one?1 
                                                                                                 
† Ed Cheng is a Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School and a doctoral candidate in the 
Department of Statistics at Columbia University. Scott Farmer is a 2013 graduate of Van-
derbilt Law School, and was a member of the 2012-13 Managing Council of the Vanderbilt 
Moot Court Board. Copyright © 2013 Edward K. Cheng. 
1 One could argue that in this situation, the scoring is still “fair” in the sense that 
each team has the same expected score or has judges randomly drawn from the 
same distribution. In reality, however, participants often consider this additional 
random factor to be “unfair,” and as a statistical matter, it nonetheless represents 
variation that one should seek to control or limit. 
T 
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Moot court organizers conventionally address consistency con-
cerns through detailed scoring rubrics and strong admonitions (or 
wishful pleas) to follow them. These rubrics, however, are unfortu-
nately difficult and unpleasant to follow. Most judges have limited 
prior exposure to the scoresheets and lack the time or interest to 
study them. In addition, during arguments, judges are principally 
focused on the participants and their legal arguments. Paying addi-
tional attention to the participants’ poise, decorum, citation of prec-
edent, and other technical details poses an unenviable multitasking 
problem. Consequently, scores become invariably impressionistic, 
allowing a judge’s personal scale to taint the scoring process. 
Ideally, one would like some mechanism for normalizing judges’ 
scores. Such a mechanism would take the raw scores and adjust 
them based on a judge’s proclivities (overly generous, typical, or 
overly harsh). But how to perform such an adjustment is far from 
obvious for organizers. In extreme cases in which one judge’s scores 
deviate wildly from all others, the competition organizers might 
drop the score, but such a procedure is entirely ad hoc, raising other 
fairness concerns. 
Another possible procedure is to drop the highest and lowest 
scores and average the remainder, a method reminiscent of some 
Olympic events.2 This method, however, is both over- and under-
inclusive: It throws away substantial amounts of information at the 
high and low ends, potentially unnecessarily. At the same time, 
while it handles extreme outliers handily, it does not adjust for the 
possibility that a participant randomly draws an especially generous 
or harsh group of judges (as opposed to a lone maverick). 
Although the focus in this Article is moot court scoring, one can 
envision many other instances of law school assessment in which 
such a normalization problem arises. Law review competitions also 
                                                                                                 
2 E.g., Samantha Ashworth, How to Score a Dive, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 2012, at 
www.chicagotribune.com/media/acrobat/2012-08/71557861-02205441.pdf (de-
scribing Olympic diving scoring procedure). Although the “drop-highest-and-
lowest” procedure addresses concerns about nationalistic bias, Olympic competi-
tions do not always face the same consistency problem seen in moot court compe-
titions, since competitors in a given round still face the same set of judges. 
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involve different sets of graders, whose subjective determinations 
must be reasonably commensurate to make fair comparisons. Even 
more intriguing, although presenting a more complicated problem, 
law school grades suffer the same normalization concern. Courses 
feature material with different degrees of difficulty, attract different 
pools of students, and are taught by different instructors. Yet, class 
rank and graduation honors are ultimately calculated under the as-
sumption that all grades are commensurate. 
In this Article, we propose a statistical method for normalizing 
scores in the moot court context. By making some reasonable as-
sumptions, we can model each judge’s propensities, allowing us to 
ultimately rank participants on a standardized scale. The method is 
quite general, accounting for not only judges, but also the procedur-
al posture of the case – for example, whether the participant argued 
for petitioner or respondent, or whether the participant was on-
brief or off-brief. Part 2 provides some basic background on the 
Vanderbilt Moot Court competition for which the model was de-
veloped. Part 3 elaborates on the normalization problem. Part 4 
introduces and details the statistical model. Part 5 applies the model 
and reports the results. Part 6 discusses the model’s implications 
and possible future extensions. The Article then briefly concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND 
ike most law schools, Vanderbilt offers an intramural moot 
court competition (“Intramural Competition”), which is run by 
its Moot Court Board. The Intramural Competition is a voluntary 
activity open to all second- and third-year students at Vanderbilt. In 
addition to awards and cash prizes for the top teams, the competi-
tion also determines successor members of the Moot Court Board.3 
Historically, approximately 75 percent of the second-year class par-
                                                                                                 
3 Thirty second-year students are chosen annually to become members of the Moot 
Court Board. Members from the eight teams who make the quarterfinals auto-
matically qualify for membership. The final fourteen spots are given to the re-
maining individuals with the highest individual scores. The individual score com-
bines the team’s brief score with the individual’s oral scores. See infra. 
L 
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ticipates in the competition.4 Each moot court team comprises two 
students, who submit a joint brief and then divide up the case for 
oral argument. 
All competitors participate in a preliminary “round robin” com-
petition. During these preliminary rounds, teams argue the two 
sides of the case against different opponents. Teams are then ranked 
based on their brief and oral scores, which are weighted equally. 
The top 16 teams advance to a single elimination tournament, ulti-
mately leading to the championship. Because the tournament is 
head-to-head, it does not raise the score normalization problem, and 
thus we will not discuss it further. Our focus will be on the prelimi-
nary round scoring only. 
Three-judge panels score the oral arguments. Typically, panels 
consist of one faculty member, one local practitioner, and one mem-
ber of the Moot Court Board. Each judge gives each competitor a 
score out of 100, which is broken down into ten categories worth 
between five and 20 points. The judges are provided with general 
scoring instructions along with scoring guidelines for each category.5 
Brief scoring is divided into “subjective” and “objective” compo-
nents. The subjective score rates the brief on its explanation and 
analysis of the problem, its overall persuasiveness, and its use of 
precedent, facts, and policy arguments. The objective score rates 
the brief on largely technical items, such as spelling, citation format, 
tone, stylistic issues, and its adherence to competition rules. Briefs 
are scored three times on the subjective criteria and twice on the 
objective criteria by Moot Court Board members. Because of the 
large number of briefs, however, the task is spread among many 
Board members, meaning that briefs will invariably be assessed by 
different sets of scorers. 
                                                                                                 
4 Students are allowed to compete in the Intramural Competition once, either 
during their second or third year of law school. However, because third-year 
students cannot advance beyond the preliminary rounds, a vast majority of stu-
dents participate during their second year. 
5 The finals deviate from this structure. For example, the 2012 Finals were judged 
by three federal appellate judges, who were free to determine the winner howev-
er they wished. 
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3. THE PROBLEM OF NORMALIZATION 
rom the outset, governing members of the 2012 Moot Court 
Board had concerns about scoring consistency in the Intramural 
Competition, particularly with respect to oral argument scores. The 
competition typically involves large numbers of participants and judg-
es interacting over the course of two preliminary argument rounds 
(one on-brief and one off-brief) held over a two-week period. As a 
consequence, the composition of judging panels varies considerably. 
Traditionally, the Board facilitates consistency by providing judg-
es with detailed information and structuring their scoring. Judges are 
given a comprehensive Bench Brief to introduce them to the issues 
and possible arguments, as well as the relevant case law. Then, scor-
ing is broken down into many specific categories, and judges receive 
guidelines defining what a particular score means in a particular cate-
gory. For example, a competitor’s “road map” during oral argument 
is given a maximum of five points, as seen in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1: EXCERPT OF A MOOT COURT SCORING RUBRIC 
 
0-1: Offers a limited introduction. Does not mention 
party’s position and/or basic arguments. First oralist on 
team only: Does not identify self, co-counsel, or client.  
2-3: Average. Provides adequate introduction but 
relies on notes and/or leaves out an element of the “road 
map.”  
4-5: Begins with “May it please the court . . .” First 
oralist on team only: Identifies self and co-counsel, 
identifies client, quickly summarized the party’s basic 
position. Both oralists on team: Gives a preview of 
party’s basic arguments with very limited reliance on notes.  
 
In theory, such a strategy cabins discretion, minimizing impres-
sionistic scoring and promoting consistency. In practice, however, 
many judges found the detailed rubric frustrating, confusing, and 
otherwise unmanageable. One of the authors (Cheng) found it near-
ly impossible to keep track of all the scoring considerations while 
F 
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also listening to the substance of the argument and engaging in a 
thoughtful dialogue with the participants. At least one alumnus re-
fused to follow the rubric at all, opting to provide only a total score 
based on his overall impression. Still other judges expressed frustra-
tion over how the rubric’s complexity made it difficult for them to 
tell which team “won” the round. 
Even for judges who navigate the multitasking challenge in good 
faith, the conventional strategies offer limited success. Judges simp-
ly disagree on the definition of “average,” a problem exacerbated by 
the fact that many judges do not see sufficient competitors to cali-
brate their impressions. Scoring also tends to be comparative among 
the four participants immediately before the judge in the given 
round, as opposed to absolute. Worse yet, within this comparative 
framework, some judges distinguish competitors using a small dif-
ference in points, while others are more dramatic. Finally, some 
judges, whether because of their practice area (for practitioners) or 
their involvement in the construction of the problem (for Board 
members), simply know more about the issues involved in the case, 
leading to a more critical assessment of a competitor’s knowledge. 
Rubrics are therefore only a partial solution to the scoring con-
sistency problem. To address the problem fully, adjustments must 
be made to the scores themselves. Unfortunately, the most natural 
procedures, such as dropping the highest and lowest scores, or ad-
justing scores based on a judge’s mean, have some serious draw-
backs. Dropping the highest or lowest scores discards scoring data in 
a context in which such data is limited and labor-intensive. Adjust-
ing scores purely based on mean judge scores requires that judges 
score a large pool of participants; otherwise, chance variations in 
whom the judge observes can result in overcorrections. For exam-
ple, if a judge happens to observe three participants from the bot-
tom 25%, the adjustment procedure will overinflate those scores. 
What we would like is to normalize the scores while minimizing 
these drawbacks. First, the model should take advantage of all the 
information available, meaning that while the procedure can weight 
or adjust the scores, it should not drop scores entirely from consid-
eration. Second, the model should take advantage of the redundancy 
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in moot court scoring, in which participants are judged multiple 
times for multiple performances. Ideally, the model should use these 
additional observations to calibrate its adjustment of scores. In the 
next Section, we propose a statistical model that accomplishes both 
of these goals. 
4. A HIERARCHICAL MODEL FOR SCORING 
n rough, abstract terms, participant scores in a moot court 
competition are the result of two factors: One is the participant’s 
speaking ability and the other is the judge’s generosity. Accordingly, 
we can sketch the following model for moot court scoring. 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!" = α+ 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦! + 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦! + ε!"  
where 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!" represents a score given by Judge 𝑗 to Participant 𝑖, 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦! is a measure of Participant 𝑖’s ability, and 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦! is a 
measure of Judge 𝑗’s generosity. α is a constant which represents the 
“grand mean” of all scores given in the competition. It merely cen-
ters the model so that all participant ability and judge generosity 
measures are centered around zero. ε!" is an error term, which rep-
resents the random “error” between the model predictions and the 
observed scores. 
We can further refine the model to account for additional char-
acteristics that may affect participant performance. For instance, we 
can add an explanatory variable 𝑃𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟!" that is a “1” when the 
participant argues for petitioner (and “0” for respondent). Similarly, 
an explanatory variable 𝑂𝑛𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓!" can account for whether the oral-
ist is arguing in the same posture as the brief his/her team wrote for 
the competition. These two explanatory variables can affect the 
score in different ways, so to weigh them appropriately, we multi-
ply them by coefficients, β! and β! respectively. The augmented 
model thus becomes: 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!" = α+ 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦! + 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦! + β! ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟!" + β! ∗ 𝑂𝑛𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓!" + ε!"  
I 
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Before moving forward, let us be clear about which values are 
observed and which need to be estimated from the data using the 
model. From the observations, we have the actual scores (𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!"), 
and we know whether the participant argued as petitioner 
(𝑃𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟!") and/or on brief (𝑂𝑛𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑓!") during that particular 
argument. We also implicitly know the participant (𝑖) and the judge 
(𝑗). All other values are “parameters” that we have to estimate using 
the model. 
Following a Bayesian approach, we can place prior distributions 
on the unknown parameters. These priors are initial probabilistic 
guesses as to how the parameter values are distributed prior to see-
ing the data. Given that both participant ability and judge generosity 
are population characteristics (like height, weight, etc.), we can 
reasonably model them as coming from normal distributions with 
mean zero and unknown variances σ!! and σ!!  respectively. In other 
words, we expect the ability and generosity estimates to be roughly 
normal – e.g., a small number of participants will be remarkably 
excellent or poor, a small number of judges will be very harsh or 
lax, but the vast majority in both categories will cluster in the cen-
ter. The means of these priors are zero because the grand mean 
term (α) effectively normalizes them to zero. The variances are ad-
ditional unknown parameters that we will handle in a moment. We 
can also model the error terms (ε!") as being normally distributed, 
here with mean zero and variance σ!!. 
We thus have the following prior distributions on the parameters: 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!   ~  𝑁(0,σ!!) 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦!   ~  𝑁(0,σ!! ) ε!"   ~  𝑁(0,σ!!) 
We have no prior beliefs about any of the other parameters in the 
model. Accordingly, we impose “flat” priors on the remaining pa-
rameters. These flat priors model all values as equally likely as an 
initial matter.6 
                                                                                                 
6 For technical reasons, we gave α, β!, and β! a flat normal prior (N(0, 1E6)), and 
the variance parameters, σ!!, σ!! , and σ!!, a flat gamma prior (Γ(1E-3, 1E-3)). 
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5. APPLICATION 
5.1. 2012 Competition Data 
he 2012 Vanderbilt Intramural Competition involved 160 par-
ticipants paired into 80 teams during the preliminary rounds. 
For subjective brief scoring, the 80 briefs were each scored three 
times using a pool of 20 judges for a total of 240 subjective brief 
scores. For objective brief scoring, the briefs were each scored 
twice using a pool of 10 judges for a total of 160 objective brief 
scores. Oral arguments featured all 160 participants arguing twice 
(once on-brief and once off-brief), each before a three-judge panel 
drawn from a pool of 73 judges. 
While we used the proposed model (suitably adapted) to normal-
ize the subjective brief, objective brief, and oral argument scores, 
for brevity we will focus solely on oral argument scores here. Figure 
2 plots histograms for the oral argument scores, as well as the mean 
scores awarded to individual participants and mean scores awarded 
by individual judges. 
5.2 Results 
sing the data described in Subsection 5.1, we estimated the 
parameters in the (hierarchical) model described in Section 4. 
Estimation was done using JAGS: Just Another Gibbs Sampler, in com-
bination with R. JAGS is an open-source program written by Martyn 
Plummer for analyzing Bayesian hierarchical models.7 R is a stand-
ard, open-source statistical software package. 
Because our methods are Bayesian, the software produces esti-
mated posterior probability distributions for each of the parameters. 
These distributions estimate each parameter’s range of possible val-
ues, and how probable those values are. “Posterior” (as opposed to 
prior) denotes the fact that the estimated distributions have been 
informed by the data observed. So for example, a participant’s ability 
might have the posterior probability distribution seen in Figure 3. 
                                                                                                 
7 See mcmc-jags.sourceforge.net/. 
T 
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FIGURE 2: HISTOGRAMS OF SCORING DATA 
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FIGURE 3: EXAMPLE POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTION 
FOR A PARTICIPANT’S ABILITY SCORE 
 
For scoring/ranking purposes, we of course do not want distri-
butions; we want single scores. Thus, we use the median of the pos-
terior distribution as the score. We also calculated 68% (i.e., one 
standard error) credibility intervals to express the amount of uncer-
tainty in the normalized score.8 
The normalized scores produced from our proposed procedure 
are listed in Table 1 and graphically displayed with 68% credibility 
intervals in Figure 4. For legibility and to protect anonymity, we 
have replaced participant names with numbers, and have also dis-
played only a randomly selected group of 36 participants, as op-
posed to the full 160. The results, however, come from estimating 
the model on the full dataset. 
Some readers may wonder whether the parameters for arguing as 
petitioner (β!) and being on brief (β!) showed any effect. Indeed, 
being the petitioner seemed to confer a disadvantage of approximate-
ly -0.5 points, a relatively minor effect when viewed in the context 
 
                                                                                                 
8 Credibility intervals are often described as the Bayesian equivalent of classical 
confidence intervals. Though they are not the same thing, they do similarly ex-
press information about uncertainty. 
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TABLE 1: (EXCERPTED) NORMALIZED SCORES 
FROM COMPETITION 
Rank Student Normalized 
Score 
 Rank  Student  Normalized 
Score 
1 # 157 12.71  19 # 120  2.34 
2 # 84 10.88  20 # 135  1.71 
3 # 115 10.44  21 # 17  0.70 
4 # 105 10.00  22 # 3  0.39 
5 # 149 8.58  23 # 40  -2.67 
6 # 66 8.54  24 # 12  -3.84 
7 # 111 8.38  25 # 65  -4.65 
8 # 144 7.45  26 # 30  -5.00 
9 # 38 7.27  27 # 49  -5.26 
10 # 136 6.53  28 # 114  -5.68 
11 # 45 6.18  29 # 102  -7.15 
12 # 72 5.49  30 # 96  -8.18 
13 # 126 5.42  31 # 101  -9.50 
14 # 151 4.82  32 # 143  -11.07 
15 # 145 4.10  33 # 68  -11.64 
16 # 124 3.55  34 # 76  -13.08 
17 # 112 2.95  35 # 50  -14.74 
18 # 48 2.71  36 # 79  -15.66  
of the participant ability scores seen in Table 1. As might be ex-
pected, arguing on brief gave a considerably larger advantage of 2.2 
points. For the preliminary rounds, these advantages/disadvantages 
are arguably of no consequence, since all teams argue both sides. The 
data does suggest, however, that in the later elimination rounds, the 
serendipity of arguing one side versus another can make a differ-
ence, particularly when teams are evenly matched. 
The model also provides generosity estimates for all of the judges, 
and the sheer magnitude of the judge generosity estimates is quite 
eye-opening. The mean of the generosity estimates is of course ap-
proximately 0 as specified by the model, but the standard error was 
a sizable 5.6, and generosity values ranged from -14.9 to 10.8. Giv-
en that the participant ability scores have similar magnitudes, one 
can easily imagine that the failure to control for judge proclivities 
can potentially affect outcomes, particularly at the extremes of the 
distribution. 
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FIGURE 4: PLOT OF NORMALIZED SCORES 
(WITH 68% CREDIBILITY INTERVALS) 
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6. DISCUSSION 
6.1. Limitations 
hile the proposed model provides a method for normalizing 
scores across judges and procedural postures, it does carry 
some cautions or limitations. These limitations were debated at 
length prior to implementing the model in the competition, and the 
organizers concluded that the benefits of normalization were well 
worth the costs. We discuss some of them here to help would-be 
adopters decide whether our approach makes sense for them. 
The primary limitation is modest instability in the estimated pa-
rameters, the most important of which are the normalized partici-
pant ability scores. The standard way of estimating the model used 
here, a Bayesian hierarchical model, involves a simulation method 
called Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Since estimation oc-
curs via simulation, estimates necessarily fluctuate from one run to 
the next, meaning that participants’ ranks can change, particularly if 
they are closely clustered. 
In our competition, the variation seen between simulation runs 
was relatively minor. Typically, ranks changed at most a few places 
(if at all), with the most movement seen in the middle of the distri-
bution, where participants are more closely clustered. At the tails, 
the normalized scores for competitors were sufficiently separated 
that random variation between runs had little effect on the rank or-
der. Since the scores of consequence – those that result in advance-
ment to later competition rounds or to invitations to the Moot 
Court Board – reside in the upper tail, we deemed the variation 
acceptable. 
As a practical matter, decisions of course must be made on the 
basis of some specific score. We thus pre-selected a single random 
seed9 for the simulation, and decisions were based on the results 
that followed. 
                                                                                                 
9 Random draws on a computer are not truly “random,” but are pseudo-random in the 
sense that the numbers generated are completely deterministic (although appearing 
random) given a starting value. One can therefore reproduce “random” simulations 
by using the same starting value. This starting value is called the random seed. 
W 
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A related drawback is the acknowledgment of uncertainty or error 
in the scoring model. Traditional competition scoring carries a cer-
tain flawless determinism. Judges score the participants, and the par-
ticipants accept those raw scores as the “truth,” the unassailable com-
petition result. In contrast, our normalization procedure introduces 
uncertainty into the outcomes. Between simulation runs, random 
variations can change the results. Even within a simulation run, the 
presence of posterior distributions with credibility intervals suggests 
that things could have turned out differently for the participants. 
In actuality, to believe that raw scores lack uncertainty is merely 
to fool ourselves. The judges’ raw scores may appear deterministic, 
but they are fundamentally not – precisely for the reasons that mo-
tivated this project from the start. Moot court competitions inevita-
bly involve some degree of serendipity and random variation. What 
set of judges a participant faces, what side of the dispute he or she 
argues, and what side’s brief he or she wrote – all are a matter of 
chance. Thus, while the actual observed scores may be certain, as a 
measure of appellate advocacy ability they are at least as uncertain as 
the normalized scores, and arguably far more. The critical question 
thus becomes whether the normalized scores reduce more uncertain-
ty than they create. Given that the judge generosity estimates are rel-
atively large, it appears that the normalized scores are a net benefit. 
Finally, hierarchical models have the considerable drawback of 
being difficult to understand and implement. Gone are the intuitive 
adjustments such as dropping the highest and lowest scores. In their 
place is a full statistical model that requires not only sophisticated 
software packages and heavy computation, but also an understand-
ing of the model and its assumptions. From a participant standpoint, 
we doubt that the model’s complexity makes much of a difference. 
Scoring rubrics and weighting schemes in moot court and other 
competitions are often highly opaque, and so whether the normali-
zation occurs using simple mechanisms or a full statistical model will 
be largely lost on participants. 
From an organizer standpoint, however, our model’s complexity 
poses a significant obstacle to broader adoption, since it currently 
requires a statistician to implement. To that end, in future work, we 
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hope to produce easy-to-use software for inputting competition 
scores, running the requisite computations, and displaying results. 
6.2. Extensions 
he proposal presented only scratches the surface of what hierar-
chical models can do in normalizing scores. For example, with-
in the moot court context, presuming sufficient data, one can theo-
retically control not only for judges and procedural posture, but 
also for opponent. To the extent that judges score arguments largely 
on a comparative basis, then perhaps the model should account for 
opponents (if not teammates) as well. Those familiar with college 
football computer rankings will undoubtedly recognize the 
“strength-of-schedule” theme. 
The idea of score normalization is also not confined to the moot 
court context. As mentioned in the Introduction, journal competi-
tions face similar issues, as do many large-scale competitions in 
which participants cannot practically be scored by a single judging 
panel. Indeed, scoring consistency is a frequent worry among organ-
izers of science fairs and other youth competitions,10 as well as facul-
ty members running large lecture courses with multiple graders or 
teaching assistants.11 
Furthermore, arguably all academic grading – or more specifical-
ly, grade point averages – would benefit from a normalization mod-
el. Instructors exhibit different levels of generosity in grading, and 
                                                                                                 
10 E.g., Discussion at ask.metafilter.com/151205/science-fair-judging (seeking 
advice for normalizing science fair scores); Fred Rose, What the Heck do My 
Scores Mean?, June 9, 2006, at fll-sw.sourceforge.net/ScoreExplaination.pdf 
(discussing scoring in the Minnesota First Lego League competition). 
11 See Norman Jacobson (2001), A Method for Normalizing Students’ Scores When 
Employing Multiple Graders, SIGCSE Bulletin 33(4):35-38; Julianne Dalcanton, 
Normalizing Grades Across TA Sections, Discover Magazine, Cosmic Variance 
Blog, Dec. 14, 2007, at blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2007/12/ 
14/normalizing-grades-across-ta-sections; Ben Krop, Justin Meyer, and Nipa 
Patel, Grading and Evaluation Procedures, at www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/ 
handle/2142/1894/Rough%20Draft.pdf (reporting survey results at the Univer-
sity of Illinois showing such concerns). 
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courses have varying degrees of difficulty. Even in contexts with 
mandatory grading curves, the pool of students in a given class may 
vary, making an A in one class more precious than in another. In-
structors and students alike intuitively understand these nuances, 
but GPAs are entirely blind to them. A hierarchical model to nor-
malize GPAs would be more complex because of the additional fac-
tors, but in theory, nothing prevents it from working – at least as-
suming sufficient data. 
7. CONCLUSION 
his Article has proposed and demonstrated the use of a Bayesian 
hierarchical model to normalize moot court competition 
scores. Specifically, the model accounts for differing levels of judge 
generosity as well as the postures from which a participant argues. 
Future work will include developing software to help other moot 
court organizations implement this model in their competitions. 
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